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1 Introduction
The use of pollution taxation has become very popular in recent decades for policy
making. According to the basic public ﬁnance theory, the optimal pollution tax
in the height of the marginal social damage of pollution, which is also called
Pigouvian tax, corrects a negative external eﬀect perfectly and leads therefore to
a desirable environmental quality.
Introducing the existence of distortionary taxes into this partial equilibrium
consideration, it could be supposed that increasing the pollution tax increases
the environmental quality. Because the consumption of the pollution producing
commodity is reduced and at the same time the generated revenues can be used to
cut other distortionary taxes which is known as the double-dividend hypothesis.
An optimised taxation system would lead therefore to a pollution tax rate which
exceeds the Pigouvian level, if the marginal revenue of the pollution tax is positive
as in the discussion assumed. Because other markets are aﬀected as well, the
connection between optimal pollution taxation and the environmental quality
has to be determined in a general equilibrium model which is the focus of this
thesis.
In the ﬁrst-best treatment of a general equilibrium model, where lump-sum
taxation is feasible, the Pigouvian tax holds as optimal. If distortionary taxes
are necessary to ﬁnance public spending, the optimal pollution tax can either
exceed or fall short of the Pigouvian level. Diﬀerent tax combinations lead to the
same optimal allocation in this so-called second-best treatment where the excess
burden of the taxation system is minimised. Hence, the conclusion of the partial
equilibrium model that a change of the tax rate automatically has an impact
on the environmental quality can not hold. Therefore, the reached allocations
instead of the optimal prices have to be viewed for determining the eﬀects of the
entire tax system on the environmental quality.
It can be shown that the second-best taxation system leads to a higher en-
vironmental quality compared to the ﬁrst-best, in contrary to the provision of
the public good which will be reduced. The use of pollution taxation leads to
a diﬀerent treatment of these two, although they have mainly the same proper-
ties. While public spending becomes more costly if distortionary taxes are used
instead of lump-sum taxation, the by the pollution taxation generated revenues
are more valuable. Hence, the existence of tax distortions has a positive impact
on the environment.
Additional government spending and therefore an increase in tax distortions
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will not - diﬀerent from the double-dividend expected - favour pollution taxes
as source of revenue. It can be shown that the environmental component of
the optimal pollution tax decreases in this case. While it could be assumed
that the environmental quality falls as well, an increase in tax distortions will
inﬂuence the environmental quality by two diﬀerent eﬀects. On the one hand,
environmental quality is negatively aﬀected by a commodity substitution eﬀect,
which let individuals consume more polluting commodities, and on the other
hand, a leisure substitution eﬀect reduces overall consumption and has therefore
a positive inﬂuence on the environment. For reasonable parameter values the
leisure substitution eﬀect is stronger and therefore a higher environmental quality
will be reached by the use of distortionary taxes.
Due to these considerations it can be concluded that a pollution tax in a tax
system where the deadweight loss is minimised will lead to a desirable improve-
ment of the environment. Policy making can therefore set the focus on optimising
the taxation system. However, if changes in the tax system occur, the impact
on the environment can not be deduced solely from knowing the change in the
pollution tax rate.
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 shows the importance
of pollution taxes in practice and gives a summary of the partial equilibrium
analysis. Chapter 3 discusses the general equilibrium model using the papers of
Fullerton (1997), Gaube (2005) and Metcalf (2003). Chapter 4 concludes.
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2 Approach
2.1 Relevance of Pollution Taxation
A policy instrument that is used for reaching environmental targets has to change
the behaviour of consumption or production to be suitable. Pollution taxation
inﬂuences the consumer’s decision through an increase in prices of the polluting
commodity. For reaching environmental targets the use of pollution taxation
became quite popular however the advantages and disadvantages of the use of
taxation compared to other policy instruments are described in literature.
In the 1970s and 1980s nearly the whole environmental policy was based on
regulations. During the 1980s the interest in market-based instruments started.
Between 1987 and 1994 alone, in the OECD countries the number of environmen-
tally related taxes and charges increased over 50 per cent.(Ekins, 1999)
Today pollution taxes1 are implemented in many diﬀerent goods for example
taxes on fuels, tires, mining, pesticides, waste, water quantity or plastic bags. The
OECD (2006) declares the existence of more than 350 environmentally related
taxes in OECD countries. The most common environmental taxes are levied on
energy products (150) and motor vehicles (125). In addition there can be found
50 waste-related taxes within OECD countries. The remaining taxes are levied
on a broad spectrum of diﬀerent tax-bases. These taxes generate revenues on
average between 2% and 2.5% of the GDP of the observed countries, which is on
average between 6% and 7% of the total tax revenue.
Because the gained share of public revenue does not seem very high, one
might think that the importance of pollution taxes within policy making is over-
estimated. As already mentioned polluting behaviour should be reduced by pollu-
tion taxation and therefore the generated revenues of one period can not be used
as an indicator for eﬀectiveness because the research and development sector as
well as the individuals will need time to adapt their behaviour. In a long-term
context this development can be seen as an argument against the use of pollution
taxation for ﬁnancing government spending. The OECD (2006, 50f) emphasizes
that short observation periods and the fact that pollution taxes are mostly used
combined with other policy instruments makes it diﬃcult to deﬁne exactly the
eﬀect of certain taxes for empirical research.
1The terminology of pollution tax is within policy making often used in a slightly diﬀerent
way, namely for taxes on measured or estimated emissions. In politics the terms environmental
taxes or environmental related taxes are more common. In this thesis the terminology pollution
tax is used in the meaning of economic theory and includes therefore all taxes that are set to
inﬂuence the market due to environmental issues.
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However it should be mentioned that pollution taxation plays a role in ﬁnanc-
ing the government budget even if the proportion is not that high. Hence, one
can conclude that environmental concerns will probably not always be the reason
for implementing pollution taxes.2
2.2 Partial Equilibrium Analysis
Although environmental quality is non-rival and non-excludable in consumption
and therefore possesses the properties of a public good, its economic treatment
diﬀers in the discussed model. The reasons and results of these diﬀerences will
be discussed in chapter 3.3.
In contrary to public goods, the decision of the environmental quality is not
steered by policy makers but instead by the general population. The quality of
environment can be seen as a basic endowment and the reached level is determined
by the consumption decision of the individuals which do not take the by the
commodities caused pollution into account. Apparently, there exists a diﬀerence
between the optimal decision of individuals and an optimal decision for society.
Therefore, pollution can be seen as a negative external eﬀect.
For an eﬃcient market the government can force the individuals to take the
occurring external cost into account and consequently correct the market failure.
Due to this, the base of environmental policy can be found in the economic theory
of externalities as seen in every public ﬁnance and environmental policy textbook.
In the case of negative external eﬀects such as pollution, marginal social cost
exceeds private marginal cost so, too much of the polluting commodity is con-
sumed. Hence, the government can set a tax at the height of the cost diﬀerence
- the marginal social damage - on the consumption of the pollution producing
commodity. As a consequence, individuals value the costs of the polluting good
correctly and the market works eﬃciently, which is deﬁned as the equilibrium at
which the cost of marginal social damage is equal to the cost of abatement, i.e. the
pollution tax. This optimal pollution tax, which implements the externalities, is
called Pigouvian tax, and does not lead to any deadweight loss. Within a partial
equilibrium model, where only the market of the pollution producing commodity
is observed, the eﬀects of the pollution tax on the environmental quality are easy
to determine. An increase of the pollution tax will lead to less consumption of
the dirty commodity and therefore to a higher environmental quality.
Based on the partial equilibrium model the origin of the so called double-
2(Oates, 1993, 135) designates as an example, that in 1987 the United States implemented
a tax on sulfur and nitrogen oxide emissions only to reduce the deﬁcit in the federal budget.
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dividend hypothesis3 can be found which claims that - if other, distortionary
taxes exist in an economy - a pollution tax does not only improve the environ-
mental quality as a ﬁrst dividend, but using the generated revenues to cut other
distortionary taxes leads to a second dividend.
If an increase in the pollution tax rate leads to an increase in tax revenue as
assumed in further discussion, to set the pollution tax above the Pigouvian level
has to be the optimal tax policy within this framework. (Oates, 1993) At ﬁrst
sight this statement seems to be plausible but in the following will be shown that
this conclusion can not hold within a general equilibrium model, where the eﬀects
of other markets are taken into account.
3For a survey of the double dividend-hypothesis and discussion of diﬀerent deﬁnitions see
for example, Goulder (1994) or Scho¨b (2003).
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3 General Equilibrium Model
3.1 Description of the Model
The used general equilibrium model which is presented in this chapter is the base
for among others, the discussed papers of Fullerton (1997), Gaube (2005) and
Metcalf (2003), as well as for the cited paper of Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994).
In the observed economy N identical individuals exist. These decide the level
of the consumption of a clean commodity C, a dirty commodity D and leisure V .
Further, the public good G and the environmental quality E inﬂuence the utility
of the individuals. The strictly quasiconcave utility function U(C,D, V, E,G) is
monotically increasing in the mentioned arguments.
Every individual has an endowment of time that is normalised to one in this
model. Hence, labour L can also be expressed as (1− V ) and is used to produce
the commodities C, D, and G. The rates of transformation between these com-
modities are normalised to unity. The constant productivity of labour is deﬁned
as h. Therefore, the production frontier of the economy is
NhL−NC −ND −G = 0. (1)
The consumption of D produces a negative external eﬀect on the environ-
ment. Hence, the total amount of the consumed dirty commodity ND aﬀects the
environmental quality E which can be written as
E = e(ND), e′(ND) < 0. (2)
The consumers take the prices pC = 1 + tC , pD = 1 + tD and pL = h(1− tL),
where the subscripts refer to the related commodities, as well as the quantities
of G and E as given. The individual’s budget constraint is therefore
pL(1− V )− pCC − pDD = 0. (3)
Individuals do not take the negative externalities of the consumption of the
dirty commodity D into account, when they maximise their utility with respect
to C, D and V
max
C,D,V
U(C,D, V, E,G) s.t. (3). (4)
This leads to the demand functions for C(pC , pD, pL, E,G), D(pC , pD, pL, E,G)
and V (pC , pD, pL, E,G), which depend on the prices of the commodities and the
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amounts of E and G. Due to these an indirect utility function can be written as
W (pC, pD, pL, E,G).
The ﬁrst-best maximisation problem
max
C,D,V,E,G
U(C,D, V, E,G) s.t. (1) and (2), (5)
describes the potential of the economy. Its corresponding optimal allocation will
be written as (CF , DF , V F , EF , GF ). The ﬁrst-order conditions of (5) imply the
Samuelson conditions, namely
∂U
∂D
+ N ∂U
∂E
e′
∂U
∂V
=
1
h
,
∂U
∂D
+ N ∂U
∂E
e′
∂U
∂C
= 1, (6)
for E and
N ∂U
∂G
∂U
∂V
=
1
h
,
N ∂U
∂G
∂U
∂C
= 1, (7)
for G.
By comparing the ﬁrst-order conditions of (4) and (5) it can be seen easily that
the eﬃciency conditions are satisﬁed if the consumer price of the dirty commodity
is corrected by a tax, namely
τ = −N
∂U
∂E
e′
λ
= tD. (8)
This term is exactly the marginal social damage of pollution which is the marginal
damage that an extra unit of consumption of the dirty commodity D has on
all N individuals. It is converted into monetary terms by the division of λ, the
marginal utility of income as seen in the ﬁrst-order conditions. Hence, the eﬃcient
allocation can be reached if the tax on the pollution producing commodity equals
the Pigouvian tax.
This ﬁrst-best pollution tax will hold if the unlikely coincidence occurs that the
amount of revenue that is generated by the Pigouvian tax is suﬃcient to cover the
public spending or if lump-sum taxation is feasible. Because it is unrealistic that
neither of these cases will happen, distortionary taxes are necessary to ﬁnance
the government spending.
If diﬀerent tax rates are implemented into the model, the government max-
imises welfare - which is deﬁned as the utility of the identical individuals in this
model - by choosing the tax rates tC , tD, tL and the level of the provided public
good G subject to the environmental externalities, and the government’s budget
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constraint
tCC + tDD + tLhL− G
N
= 0, (9)
which guarantees the ﬁnancing of the public good. This second-best maximisation
problem can be written as
max
tC ,tD,tL,G
W (pC , pD, pL, E,G) s.t. (2) and (9), (10)
where (CS, DS, V S, ES, GS) is the corresponding second-best allocation. At this
point it should to be noted that maximising the welfare is equivalent to minimising
the dead weight loss of a tax system.
3.2 The Height of the Tax Rate
The ﬁrst intuitive thought about the quality of the environment in an economy
that uses pollution taxation as policy instrument, leads to the height of the tax
rate. One might think that with a higher tax rate on the dirty commodity, less
pollution automatically occurs as has been shown as well by the results of the
partial equilibrium model.
As an answer on the partial equilibrium discussion and its conclusions Boven-
berg and de Mooij (1994) discussed the optimal pollution tax rate in the already
mentioned general equilibrium model. In this important contribution they deal
with an economy that uses distortionary taxes on labour and no taxation on
the clean commodity. They demonstrated that the optimal second-best pollution
tax4 lies below the Pigouvian tax, which could lead to the misinterpretation that
the environmental quality falls as well short of the optimal Pigouvian level.
It is easy to show within the presented model that the tax rate on the dirty
commodity depends only on the normalisation that is used for calculating the
second-best optimum and can therefore exceed or fall short of the Pigouvian tax.
For the following treatment the paper of Fullerton (1997) is used.
3.2.1 Normalisation
For explaining the eﬀects on the optimal pollution tax rates, diﬀerent possibilities
to ﬁnance the provision of the public good are viewed which is seen as constant
(dG = 0).
4Another interpretation could be that they discuss the diﬀerence between the tax rates tD
and tC , and therefore the environmental component of the optimal pollution tax as in chapter
3.4 which would be the same because of the used normalisation.
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The total diﬀerential of the utility function U(C,D, V, E,G) is set to zero
because no utility improvement in the second-best optimum can be invented.
Using the properties dG = 0 and dV = −dL one can write
dU = 0 = −∂U
∂V
dL +
∂U
∂C
dC +
∂U
∂D
dD +
∂U
∂E
e′NdD. (11)
After inserting the ﬁrst-order conditions of the individual’s maximisation problem
(see appendix A.1), equation (8) and using the diﬀerentiated production frontier
(1), namely hdL = dC + dD + dG
N
where dG=0, one gets
0 = htLdL + tCdC + (tD − τ)dD. (12)
If the tax on labour as well as the tax on the clean commodity are set to zero
(tL = tC = 0) the Pigouvian tax as optimal solution holds. This case equals the
already presented ﬁrst-best setting.
In the ﬁrst normalisation that is treated tC = 0 and tL > 0 are assumed
which means that the government spending is ﬁnanced by a labour tax, while the
market for the clean commodity stays tax-free. Inserting these assumptions into
equation (12) leads to the optimal condition of
tD − τ = −htL dL
dD
. (13)
The decisive term dL
dD
is positive which is the already mentioned result of the paper
of Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994). Therefore, it is shown that the second-best
pollution tax falls short of the ﬁrst-best Pigouvian tax (tSD < τ).
The second normalisation assumes that no labour tax is used (tL = 0). Thus,
additional public revenue is generated by a tax on the clean commodity (tC > 0).
Resultingly equation (12) leads to
tD − τ = −tC dC
dD
. (14)
Because the labour market is not aﬀected, and revenue neutrality is assumed, an
increase of tD implies a decrease of tC . Hence the term
dC
dD
has to be negative.
It is clearly seen that this second-best pollution tax exceeds the Pigouvian level
(tSD > τ).
Fullerton (1997, 249) also shows that besides the above treated normalisations
the tax on dirty commodities can be set to zero (tD = 0). Therefore, the taxes
on clean commodities and labour are used to ﬁnance the government spending.
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In this treatment a part of the raised labour tax is given back as a subsidy on the
clean commodity. This tax combination leads to the same second-best allocation
as the others. Thus the same environmental quality can be reached without using
any tax on the pollution producing commodity.
As shown above three tax combinations lead to diﬀerent tax rates but to the
same optimal allocations. The used normalisation does not have any eﬀect on the
second-best allocation and therefore nor on the optimal amount of the supplied
public good or the environmental quality. Consequently, no conclusion from these
results on the environmental quality can be drawn, but a change in relative prices
can be observed. Because of the tax rate change compared to the ﬁrst-best, the
marginal rates of substitution as known from the Samuelson conditions (6) and
(7) change.5
Therefore, tSD < τ leads to
∂U
∂D
+ N ∂U
∂E
e′
∂U
∂C
< 1, (15)
which shows that the tax diﬀerential between the tax rates in second-best is
lower than in ﬁrst-best. This means the dirty commodity becomes proportionally
cheaper compared to the clean commodity in second-best.
For tSD > τ the tax diﬀerential between the dirty commodity and leisure is
higher in the second-best than in the ﬁrst-best treatment which is seen in
∂U
∂D
+ Ne′ ∂U
∂E
∂U
∂V
>
1
h
. (16)
Hence, the dirty commodity is proportionally more expensive to leisure in second-
best.
3.2.2 Discussion of the Results
As it has been shown the second-best allocation can be reached by diﬀerent tax
combinations. One tax normalisation leads to an optimal pollution tax that is
lower than the Pigouvian level, whereas another optimal pollution tax can be
found above the Pigouvian tax and a third normalisation does not have a tax
rate on the pollution producing commodity at all.
The connection between the tax normalisation and the resulting height of the
pollution tax rates can be explained intuitively. Within this discussion the labour
5The mathematical treatment originates from Gaube (2005).
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tax can be seen as a uniform commodity tax. Therefore, it can be replaced by
raising the taxes tC and tD simultaneously. Hence, revenue is solely generated
by the used labour tax in the ﬁrst normalisation. Because the environmental
component of the optimal pollution tax is reduced in a distortionary taxation
system as will be seen as well in chapter 3.4, it is obvious that the optimal
pollution tax falls short of the Pigouvian level if solely labour taxation is used.
These diﬀerences demonstrate that the knowledge if the second-best pollution
tax exceeds or falls short of the Pigouvian tax is not suﬃcient to give any state-
ment about its impacts on the environment and the public good. The reached
allocations of an optimised taxation system are not aﬀected by the used normal-
isation and therefore the tax combination.
These calculations oﬀer no conclusion to the question if distortionary taxes
inﬂuence the environmental quality. If besides a desirable amount of environ-
mental quality can be reached within a second-best optimal taxation system, can
not be answered either. For comparing ﬁrst-best and second-best environmental
quality there is no way around having a look at the allocations instead of the tax
rates and therefore the quantities instead of the prices.
In reality it is obvious that the tax system for ﬁnancing government expendi-
ture consists of many diﬀerent taxes. These implements that to try to explain the
real ﬁnancing system in the model would mean that all commodities are taxed
(tC = 0, tD = 0 and tL = 0) as seen in equation (12). Using all taxes in the model
would make at least one of them redundant and can be expressed through a com-
bination of the others as mentioned, but the change of the relative prices due
to the diﬀerent normalisations can give policy making a clue to ﬁnd the optimal
pollution tax.
Fullerton (1997, 249) argues that if economies have higher labour taxes the
normalisation where the tax on the clean commodity is set to zero is more rel-
evant, whereas if commodity taxes are the main source of revenues, the other
theoretical treatment is the more interesting one. He also mentions that some
policy instruments are easier to implement than others and therefore the knowl-
edge of setting diﬀerent tax combinations is an advantage. These arguments
seem quite plausible, but the question about the reached environmental quality
remains unanswered.
3.3 Comparison of First-Best and Second-Best Allocations
Following their calculation, Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994, 1088) argued that
not only the public good consumption, but as well the environmental quality is
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crowded out by high costs of public funds. One can imagine that the crowding-
out argument is based on the fact that generating government revenue is more
costly in the second-best optimum than in the ﬁrst-best one, because of the tax
distortions which generate an excess burden.
A conclusion of the mentioned crowding-out idea could be that higher spend-
ing on the public good leads automatically to less environmental quality in a
second-best world, if the government spending will be kept on a constant level as
it is assumed. This would mean the government has the possibility to increase
environmental quality at cost to the public good and vice versa, which would lead
to an ineﬃcient allocation.
As it has been shown that solely the knowledge of the height of the optimal tax
rates is not suﬃcient to answer the impact of pollution taxes on the environmental
quality. In this chapter, instead of the prices the focus will be changed to the
optimal tax systems reached allocations. Therefore, it will be investigated how
the entire tax system aﬀects the environmental quality. For the comparison of
the ﬁrst-best and second-best allocations the treatment of Gaube (2005) will be
used.
The for this calculation used utility function, with a subutility function for
the goods C and D can be written as
U(C,D, V, E,G) = M(C,D) + V + B(G) + H(E), (17)
where M(C,D), B(G) and H(E) are strictly concave and e′′(ND) = 0 is as-
sumed. Due to the additive separability of the utility, the demand functions for
the commodities C and D are independent of G and E. Through these strict
assumptions the diﬀerence of the environmental quality E and the public good
G can be easier expressed.
The normalisation tL = 0 will be used within the treatment and hence the
ﬁrst-order conditions of the second-best maximisation problem (10) with respect
to tC , tD and G can be written as
tC : −C
h
+
∂U
∂E
Ne′
∂D
∂tC
+ μ
∂R
∂tC
= 0 (18)
tD : −D
h
+
∂U
∂E
Ne′
∂D
∂tD
+ μ
∂R
∂tD
= 0 (19)
G :
∂U
∂G
− μ
N
= 0, (20)
where μ is the Lagrange multiplier of the governments budget constraint and
R := tCC + tDD + htLL, the overall government tax revenue.
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The ﬁrst order-condition due to tD is in the following, the point of interest
if the focus is set on the pollution tax and its eﬀects. Thus, implementing the
ﬁrst-best allocation by means of its prices, equation (19) can be rearranged (see
appendix A.3) to
pSC − pFC
h
∂D
∂tC
+
[
pSD − pFD
h
−Ne′
(
∂U
∂EF
− ∂U
∂ES
)]
∂D
∂tD
+
(
μ− 1
h
)
∂R
∂tD
= 0.
(21)
Now, equations (18), (20) and (21) can be used for an comparison of the
optimal allocations of the ﬁrst-best and second-best allocation of G and E.
3.3.1 Model without Cross-Price Eﬀects
Consumers see an tax on a commodity as an increase in its price. If the dirty
commodity becomes proportionally more expensive compared to others, its con-
sumption will be reduced. Therefore, the own-price elasticity of a commodity is
an important concept for the treatment and the observation of the eﬀectiveness
of pollution taxes in empirical research. If a tax increase does not change the
demand, it can not be seen as successful from an environmental point of view.
Such examples can be found in environmental policy.6
Within empirical research a diﬀerence in price elasticities between short run
and long run can be observed. If the focus is set for example on the energy
or transport sector where pollution taxes are quite common, it is obvious that
the source for energy cannot be substituted that easily in the short run and
will therefore have a low own-price elasticity. It can be imagined that in long run
more eﬃcient energy production or alternative technologies are feasible and aﬀect
therefore the environmental quality.7 Anyway, these adjustments are of course
not observable within the discussed model. They can only give a clue as to the
reachable equilibrium.
While the importance of own-price elasticity is quite obvious, the following
ﬁrst theoretical consideration of the model denies the existence of cross-price
eﬀects between the commodities C and D. The assumption that a tax change of
one good does not have any inﬂuence on the consumed amount of the other - in
the model the tax of the clean good does not inﬂuence the consumed amount of
the dirty one and vice versa - seems to be quite strict. On the other hand, within
this framework some explanations could be constructed. If the dirty commodity is
6e.g. The introduction of a SO2 tax in France or pesticide tax in Sweden did not have any
inﬂuence on the consumption level.(OECD, 2006, 63)
7For an overview of short run and long run price elasticities of diﬀerent pollution taxes see
OECD (2006, Ch.3).
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energy and the clean one food for example, the absence of a cross-price elasticity
does not seem that unrealistic.
Of course these assumptions simplify the calculations and the result will give
a ﬁrst hint of the eﬀects even if they are attackable. In any case, in a second step
the model can be extended.
As was already mentioned the provision of a public good G will be reduced
if a change of the tax system from a ﬁrst-best to a second-best one takes place
(GS < GF ).
A distortionary tax tSC > 0 on the clean commodity is assumed. The above
mentioned subutility function implies because of its strict concavity that the
own-price elasticities are negative, namely ∂C
∂tC
< 0 and ∂D
∂tD
< 0. The absence of
cross-price eﬀects can be written as ∂C
∂tD
= ∂D
∂tC
= 0.
These assumptions reduce equation (18) to
−C
h
+ μ
(
tC
∂C
∂tC
+ C
)
= 0, (22)
which implies that μ > 1
h
because of μ > 0 (see equation (20)) and tC > 0.
Therefore, (20) leads to N ∂U
∂GS
> 1
h
, which is compared to the ﬁrst-best allocation
(7) which can be written as N ∂U
∂GF
= 1
h
, using the property ∂U
∂V
= 1. Because the
utility function is assumed to be strictly concave in G and ∂U
∂GF
< ∂U
∂GS
, the proof
of GS < GF is given.
This proof reconsidered a well known result of the public good provision in a
distorted tax system, namely that the amount of the provided public good will
decrease in a tax system with tax distortions compared to a ﬁrst-best situation.
This is explained because government spending becomes more costly if distor-
tionary taxes are used to ﬁnance them which has been seen by comparing μ, the
price for increasing the provision of the public good or in other words the shadow
price of public revenue, with the marginal utility of of income 1
h
as seen in the
individual’s ﬁrst-order condition (∂U
∂V
= 1). It has been seen that this is higher
in second-best (μ > 1
h
) than in ﬁrst-best (μ = 1
h
) where lump-sum taxation is
feasible. Therefore, additional revenue from the pollution tax in second-best is
more valuable. If the environmental quality has the same characteristics as an
ordinary public good, as well less environmental quality in second-best than in
ﬁrst-best would have to be expected.
Using a tax on the clean commodity for ﬁnancing government spending (tSC >
0), it can be shown that the environmental quality is higher in the second-best
allocation than in the ﬁrst-best if the marginal revenue of a tax on the pollution
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producing good is positive and vice versa, which can be written as ES > EF ⇔
∂R
∂tD
> 0.8
The already shown properties μ > 1
h
and ∂D
∂tD
< 0 hold. Equation (21) implies
because of ∂R
∂tD
> 0 and ∂D
∂tC
= 0 that
[
pSD − pFD
h
−Ne′
(
∂U
∂EF
− ∂U
∂ES
)]
∂D
∂tD
< 0. (23)
It is assumed that the environmental quality in second-best is lower than in
ﬁrst-best (ES ≤ EF ), which implies because of (2) that the consumed amount of
the dirty commodity lies in the second-best allocation above the one in the ﬁrst-
best (DS ≥ DF ). Utility is strictly concave in E and due to the assumptions a
marginal change in the tax rate tD leads to the same decrease in the consumption
of D as a marginal change in the consumer price of D ( ∂D
∂tD
= ∂D
∂pD
< 0). It follows
that ∂U
∂EF
− ∂U
∂ES
< 0 and pSD − pFD < 0.
Because of the properties e′ < 0 and ∂D
∂tD
< 0, the total term would be greater
than zero which is a contradiction to equation (23). Therefore, ES > EF is
proven.
A distorted taxation system leads to the provision of less public good than in
a tax system where lump-sum taxation is feasible, but at the same time higher
environmental quality in second-best is oﬀered. Because of the distortionary
taxes, public revenues are more costly in the second-best allocation than in ﬁrst-
best. Therefore, provision of G is more expensive and less of it will be provided.
At the same time environmental quality improves in comparison to the ﬁrst-
best allocation because the by the pollution tax generated revenue becomes more
valuable from a social point of view as seen above at the comparision of μ.
What has to be emphasised at this point is that the obtained results depend
on the condition that a marginal shift of the pollution tax increases the overall
tax revenues ( ∂R
∂tD
> 0). This argument equals the proposition that the optimal
pollution tax can be found on the normal side of the Laﬀer curve.
3.3.2 Model with Cross-Price Eﬀects
The same proposition as before, namely that in a second-best taxation system
less of the public good is provided (GS < GF ) and the marginal revenue of
the pollution taxation is positive ( ∂R
∂tD
> 0) will be extended by the assumption
that cross-price eﬀects ∂C
∂tD
and ∂D
∂tC
are signiﬁcant. It will be shown that the
8The proof is done in the direction of ⇐.
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environmental quality in second-best will still exceed the one in the ﬁrst-best
optimum (ES > EF ).
This more complex calculation can be bypassed by the assumption that the
demand function D(pC , pD, pL) is convex in prices pC and pD. Because of the
normalisation tL = 0, the price for labour pL = h stays constant in ﬁrst-best and
second-best.
The assumed property of the demand function implies the condition
(pSC − pFC)
∂D
∂tC
+ (pSD − pFD)
∂D
∂tD
≥ DS −DF . (24)
Using this result in equation (21) leads to
DS −DF
h
−Ne′
(
∂U
∂EF
− ∂U
∂ES
)
∂D
∂tD
+
(
μ− 1
h
)
∂R
∂tD
≤ 0. (25)
It is known from equations (20) and (7) that GS < GF ⇔ μ > 1
h
. Utility is
strictly concave in E and ∂D
∂tD
< 0, as well as ∂R
tD
> 0 hold. The proof follows that
of chapter 3.3.1.
It will be assumed again that ES ≤ EF . This implies as already shown DS ≥
DF . Therefore ∂U
∂EF
− ∂U
∂ES
< 0. Because of the properties e′ < 0 and ∂D
∂tD
< 0 this
result contradicts equation (25). Hence, it is proven that the ﬁrst-best treatment
leads to less environmental quality than the second-best (ES > EF ).
As seen, less provision of the public good G in second-best corresponds to
more provision of the environmental quality E also in the case where cross-price
eﬀects are signiﬁcant. This means that the discussion achieves the same results
with and without the existence of cross-price eﬀects.
The assumption ∂R
∂tD
> 0 still plays an important role. In the case of cross-
price eﬀects the impact on the overall revenue depends as well on the fact that the
change of the tax rate inﬂuences the consumption of the other markets. Therefore,
fulﬁlling this condition is more diﬃcult.
3.3.3 Decomposition of the Eﬀects
The occurring environmental eﬀects of moving from the ﬁrst-best to the second-
best allocation can be determined by using the allocation (CZ , DZ , V Z , EZ , GZ),
which is deﬁned by the minimum of resources that are needed to reach the same
utility level as in the second-best treatment if no distortionary taxes exist.
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Therefore, the total environmental eﬀect can be decomposed into
EF − ES = (EF −EZ) + (EZ −ES), (26)
where the ﬁrst parenthesis describes the income eﬀect and the second the substi-
tution eﬀect.
The income eﬀect is deﬁned by the fact that ﬁrst-best and second-best alloca-
tion lie on diﬀerent indiﬀerence curves, which will not be observable in this model
because quasilinear preferences are assumed. Therefore, an eﬀect of an exogenous
increase in income can not be determined and so, neutrality is assumed implicitly.
Empirical research can give some clues about the income eﬀects of diﬀerent dirty
commodities, but it has to be emphasised that if the income eﬀect of pollution
tends in one direction it will have a strong inﬂuence on the results.
The substitution eﬀect originates from the occurring price change and has so
due to the results a positive inﬂuence on the environmental quality. It can be
decomposed again into a leisure substitution eﬀect which reduces pollution, and
a commodity substitution eﬀect which increases pollution as will be extensively
discussed in chapter 3.4.3.
3.3.4 Discussion of the Results
This chapter showed that the provision of the public good in a second-best setting
is lower than in ﬁrst-best and therefore the crowding-out hypothesis holds for
it, but at the same time higher environmental quality in second-best treatment
than in ﬁrst-best is reached. Therefore, for the environment even if it has the
same properties as a public good, namely it is non-rival and non-excludable, the
hypothesis can not hold. Hence, it has to be emphasised that environmental
quality and ordinary public good can not be treated in the same way in this
model. Environmental quality does not compete with other public goods in a
second-best world if pollution taxation is used. It has to be assumed that this
result depends on the fact that the environmental policy generates revenues in
the observed economy.
The results can be intuitively described with the argumentation of Gaube
(2005, 2) that because of the distortionary tax of the second-best taxation system
which replaces the lump-sum tax of the ﬁrst-best, public funds are more costly.
At the same time created revenues from the environmental protection are more
valuable from a social point of view. Within this context a taxation system with
distortionary taxes provides more room for environmental protection.
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In the second-best treatment the idea to reduce the environmental quality
from ES to EF would lead to a welfare gain and at the same time to a desirable
amount of the environmental quality - at least the externalities would be inter-
nalized - can not hold. Due to the assumption of the positive marginal revenue of
the pollution tax and the fact that revenue of the pollution tax in second-best is
more valuable from a social point of view as seen above at the optimal provision
of G, a reduction in environmental quality decreases public revenue more than the
reachable welfare gain by reducing pollution taxation. Hence, the environment is
optimally more protected in a second-best world.
It should be mentioned at this point that the results of this chapter are based
on some strict assumptions and restrictions, but the model gives a clue that the
use of distortionary taxes increases environmental quality.
3.4 Tax Distortions
In the last chapter the idea that distortionary taxes have a positive inﬂuence on
the environmental quality has been given. This poses the question of how the
optimal tax rates react within higher tax distortions and how these inﬂuence the
environmental quality, which will be discussed in this chapter using the paper of
Metcalf (2003) and its corresponding working paper (Metcalf, 2000).
As in the last chapter the normalisation tL = 0 holds for this consideration.
An additional speciﬁcation of the environmental quality within the model will
be used for the calculations. The public good G, will stand for all government
services and contributes to the environmental quality, in other words, a part of
the government spending also causes pollution. This fraction will be deﬁned as
γ and therefore the environmental quality can be written as
E = e(ND + γG), e′(ND + γG) < 0. (27)
A homothetic subutility function for C and D, namely Q(C,D) will be used
as in chapter 3.3, but here weak separability between the subutility and leisure
instead of additive separability are assumed. σ, the log-linearised substitution
elasticity in consumption of the commodities and therefore the preferences can
be written as
Cˆ − Dˆ = σ(tˆD − tˆC), (28)
where the hats stand for the proportional change of the commodities, namely
Cˆ = dC
C
, Dˆ = dD
D
and where tˆD =
dtD
1+tD
and tˆC =
dtC
1+tC
is the proportional change
of the tax of the consumer price. Because of pC = 1 + tC and pD = 1 + tD it
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follows that tˆC = pˆC and tˆD = pˆD.
Constant government spending assumed, equation (14) and therefore the rela-
tionship between the optimal tax rates of tD and tC in second-best can be written
(see appendix A.4) as
tD = tC + (1− tC)τ, (29)
where  is the uncompensated labour supply elasticity of this model.
As already seen in chapter 3.1 and 3.2, if there is no need for distortionary
taxes, the optimal tax on the polluting commodity equals the Pigouvian level.
If tC is required, the Pigouvian tax increment that is deﬁned as the diﬀerence
between the tax on the polluting good and the tax on the clean good, namely
(tD − tC) stays at the Pigouvian level, as long as labour is oﬀered at a constant
level, which means that the labour supply elasticity  is zero. If tC > 0, then
tD − tC is smaller than τ , which means that the Pigouvian tax increment falls
short of the marginal social damage.
3.4.1 Increase in Government Services
The government services G are treated as an exogenous variable in the following.
It is assumed that the height of the government spending is set at a certain level
and for achieving the necessary tax revenues the government chooses the tax rates
in an optimal way, which means that they minimise the deadweight loss.
This assumption seems to be quite realistic because a political process leads
to the decision of G. One could think that a newly elected government follows a
diﬀerent policy to the previous one and therefore a change in the public spendings
will occur. However the reasons for higher government spending are described
higher spending will lead to higher tax distortions in the treated model and its
the impact on optimal tax rates as well on the environmental quality can be
observed.
3.4.2 Impact on the Tax Rates
Equation (29) can be written as
tD = τ + (1− τ)tC , (30)
where it is seen that dG > 0 implies that sgn(dtC) = sgn(dtD) > 0 as long as
1− τ > 0, which is in the following assumed to hold and Laﬀer curve eﬀects are
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still assumed to be absent for both tax rates.9
Due to the mentioned change of the government spending the total diﬀerential
of equation (29) and therefore of the Pigouvian tax increment can be written as
d(tD − tC) = −τdtC . (31)
An increase of G is accompanied by a fall of the Pigouvian tax increment, as long
as  > 0. In other words, the diﬀerence between the used tax rates decrease if an
increase in government spending is necessary.
It therefore results that increased public spending is not optimally ﬁnanced
by solely an increase of the pollution tax as mentioned in the double-dividend
discussion.
3.4.3 Impact on the Environmental Quality
After the eﬀects on the tax rates - that are accompanied by an increase in the
government spending and therefore in tax distortions - are shown, the focus will
be set again on the environmental quality.
If for example, the government spends the additional expenditures solely on
clean commodities, this by itself would have a positive eﬀect on the environmental
quality and therefore the observed conclusions about the occurring eﬀects would
be inﬂuenced. To avoid this, it is assumed that the government spending will be
transacted in the same proportion for clean and dirty commodities as done by the
individuals and hence demand side eﬀects can be ruled out. As already mentioned
the fraction of the government spending for dirty commodities will be deﬁned as
γ and therefore the amount of the dirty commodities due to government services
can be written as
γG ≡ πD
πC + πD
G, (32)
where πC =
C
hL
and πD =
D
hL
are the shares of the commodities of total production.
The production shares πC , πD and πG =
G
NhL
sum up to one.
As seen in equation (27) environmental quality increases if ND+γG decreases.
The total diﬀerential dD + γ dG
N
< 0 can be rearranged to
(1− πG)Dˆ + πGGˆ < 0. (33)
The total diﬀerential of the production frontier (1), namely dL = dC
h
+ dD
h
+ dG
Nh
9Using a high  of 0.5, this expression is positive, as long as τ < 2, which means that the
marginal social damage of pollution does not exceed twice the production cost of the dirty
commodity.
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can be written as
Lˆ = πCCˆ + πDDˆ + πGGˆ (34)
which says that a change in labour supply leads to changes in production. There-
fore, equations (28) and (34) can be combined by substituting Cˆ to
(1− πG)Dˆ + πGGˆ = πCσ(tˆC − tˆD) + Lˆ. (35)
For statements about the change of the environmental quality due to an in-
crease in government spending the right hand term, namely πCσ(tˆC− tˆD)+ Lˆ has
to be viewed. If this term is smaller than zero environmental quality improves as
seen in equation (33).
To deﬁne the occurring eﬀects, the term can be viewed as split. The ﬁrst term
can be declared as a commodity substitution eﬀect, while the second term can
be interpreted as a leisure substitution eﬀect.
Since the Pigouvian tax increment falls, the commodity substitution eﬀect,
which says that the individuals will substitute from the clean commodity C to
the dirty commodity D, will be positive (see appendix A.4). One could explain
this because the dirty commodity becomes relatively cheaper compared to the
clean commodity. It has to be noted that the strength of the eﬀect will depend
on σ, the elasticity of substitution . Obviously this commodity substitution eﬀect
will worsen the environmental quality of the economy because consumed clean
commodities will be replaced by dirty ones.
Meanwhile the right hand term deals with the labour supply, namely
Lˆ = wˆ, (36)
which will fall as long as the real wage w = h
pQ
falls and the labour supply
elasticity  is not completely inelastic. h can be seen as the ﬁxed gross wage
because the labour market stays untaxed. pQ is a price index of the consumption
bundle Q(C,D).
The real wage will be reduced, if the tax rates of the commodity C as well as on
D rise. Therefore, a change of the real wage can be written as dw = −dpCC−dpDD
LpQ
and rearranged to
wˆ = −φtˆC − (1− φ)tˆD, (37)
where φ = pCC
pCC+pDD
, which is the fraction of the individuals’ spending on the
clean commodity and therefore (1− φ) the spending on the dirty commodity.
Raised tax rates lead to a lower real wage and therefore the consumers sub-
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stitute commodities by leisure, which does not contribute to pollution and is
therefore assumed as clean in this model. Hence, the leisure substitution eﬀect is
working for the environment.
Consequently, the total eﬀect on environmental quality depends on two eﬀects
within this model. On the one hand there is the commodity substitution eﬀect,
which has a negative inﬂuence on the environmental quality, and on the other
hand the leisure substitution eﬀect that decreases pollution. Which of these
eﬀects is stronger and will overlay the other depends obviously on the relative
size of these two.
3.4.4 Comparative Static
Metcalf implemented parameter values for a more seizable discussion of the above
mentioned eﬀects. These values can be seen in table 1 (see appendix A.6.1).
As seen in table 2 (see appendix A.6.2) for an increased government revenue
of 10% the Pigouvian tax increment falls for all values in the range of estimates.
This means that the diﬀerence between the tax and therefore the price of the
dirty and the clean commodity becomes smaller and the dirty commodity will
become proportionally cheaper for all estimations.
For nearly all estimated values, the impact of the increase of the government
revenues on the environmental quality can be emitted as positive within the range
of estimation, except one case where a high elasticity of substitution and a low
labour supply elasticity lead to an decline of environmental quality as can be
found in table 3 (see appendix A.6.3).
3.4.5 Discussion of the Results
This chapter showed that a tax system with distortionary taxes has an inﬂuence
on the tax rates as well as on the environmental quality. Higher distortions
due to higher government spending lead on the one hand to a decrease of the
diﬀerence between the used tax rates, and at the same time to less pollution and
therefore a higher environmental quality. This conﬁrms the already mentioned
quote from Gaube (2005) that it seems that distortions in a taxation system oﬀer
more room for environmental protection. Within the discussed model the height
of government spending could be seen as an indicator for environmental quality.
That the Pigouvian tax increment falls when higher government revenues are
needed can be explained intuitively. Metcalf (2003, 318) notes that the optimal
pollution tax consists out of a Ramsey tax component and an environmental
component. Due to the assumed separability between leisure and consumption
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goods it can be shown that the optimal Ramsey components of the consumption
goods are equal. Higher public revenue increases the Ramsey tax component,
while the weight on the environmental component falls, as seen in the decrease
of the diﬀerence between the tax rates.
This result is not surprisingly because as known from taxation theory the
excess burden of a tax is minimised by the Ramsey tax which becomes more im-
portant, if higher tax distortions exist. Hence, both commodity tax rates increase.
If on the other hand the environmental tax component would be increased an ad-
ditional excess burden would occur. Due to this consideration, the connection
between the diﬀerent optimal pollution tax rates in chapter 3.2 is evident.
Two diﬀerent eﬀects due to an increase of taxation play an important role
for the discussion about the environmental quality within the model. There is,
on the one side, a commodity substitution eﬀect that increases the consumption
of dirty commodities and a leisure substitution eﬀect that lets the individuals
substitute from consumption to leisure. As it has been seen, the labour market
is as well aﬀected through diﬀerent channels and plays an important role for the
discussion about the impact on the environment, even if it stays untaxed within
this model. It can be concluded that solely the knowledge of a change in the
optimal pollution tax rate will not be suﬃcient to conclude the impact on the
environment.
Metcalf (2003, 320) emphasises that the assumption of leisure as clean is
not accurate and extreme. This point is not totally understandable because
consumption is deﬁned as consuming clean and dirty commodities. If pollution
producing commodities are consumed in the leisure time, these are already deﬁned
through consumption. Hence, leisure itself will not aﬀect the environment.
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4 Conclusion
This thesis discusses the connection between the optimal pollution taxation and
its impacts on the environmental quality by mean of a general equilibrium model.
That there can be found very few literature that deals with these eﬀects - the
obvious reason for using pollution taxes - is surprising.
The environmental quality in a second-best taxation system exceeds the ﬁrst-
best level. Additional tax distortions lead to a further reduction of pollution,
while the environmental component of the optimal pollution tax decreases. This
result can be seen as a contradiction to the mentioned double-dividend idea be-
cause the Ramsey component of a tax minimises the excess burden and is therefore
crucial if a distorted tax system is viewed.
If the taxation system is not set optimally, higher tax distortions have to be
expected. Due to the obtained results, it has to be assumed that the overall
consumption will be reduced and has therefore a positive impact on the envi-
ronmental quality. But, depending on the properties of the pollution producing
commodities, possible impacts of an income eﬀect could play an important role.
It should be noted that all obtained results concerning the optimal pollution
tax and the environmental quality depend on the fact that an increase in the
pollution tax rate leads to an increase in the overall public revenue. If this
assumption falls the reached results can not hold. If as a starting point, the case
where no tax on the pollution producing commodity exists would be considered,
the assumption would hold easily. But because the discussion takes place at a
pollution tax rate above the Pigouvian level, its fulﬁllment can be more diﬃcult.
The result that the environmental quality will be higher if distortionary taxes
exist than if lump-sum taxation would be feasible, while the provision of the
public good will be reduced depends obviously on the fact that only pollution
taxation is used as pollution abatement policy within the discussed model. If the
opposite case is assumed, namely that the environmental policy causes cost and
does not generate public revenue, no diﬀerence between the environment and a
public good will be observable. Within the used models an additional pollution
abatement instrument could be implemented as a fraction of the public good, but
then the positive inﬂuence on the utility from the abatement also has to be taken
into account. Even if mixed policy instruments as in reality have an impact on
the obtained results it can be concluded that the use of pollution taxation leads
to another treatment of the environment within policy making.
Within a taxation system, many diﬀerent targets as competitiveness of the
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economy or distributional concerns will have to be taken into account. How
these aﬀect the environment can not directly be answered within the discussed
model, but it can be concluded that, if the deadweight loss of a taxation system
is minimised a positive impact on the environment can be expected, but the
occurring environmental eﬀects should be still observed.
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A Appendix
A.1 First-order conditions of (4) and (5)
Maximisation problem (4) implies ∂U
∂C
= λ(1 + tC),
∂U
∂D
= λ(1 + tD), and
∂U
∂V
=
λh(1− tL), while the ﬁrst-order conditions of (5) imply ∂U∂C = λ, ∂U∂D + ∂U∂E e′N = λ,
∂U
∂V
= λh, and ∂U
∂G
= λ 1
N
, where λ denotes the belonging Lagrange multiplier.
A.2 Derivation of (18), (19), and (20)
Using the utility function (17), the second-best maximization problem leads to
tC :
∂W
∂tC
+
∂W
∂E
∂E
∂D
∂D
∂tC
+ μ
∂R
∂tC
= 0, (A.1)
tD :
∂W
∂tD
+
∂W
∂E
∂E
∂D
∂D
∂tD
+ μ
∂R
∂tD
= 0, (A.2)
G :
∂W
∂G
− μ
N
= 0, (A.3)
where μ is the Lagrange multiplier.
Roy’s identity leads to ∂W
∂tC
= −Cλ and ∂W
∂tD
= −Dλ. The assumed utility
function and tL = 0 leads to
∂U
∂V
= 1. Therefore, λ = ∂U
∂V
1
h
= 1
h
. Inserting these
results and the properties ∂W
∂E
= ∂U
∂E
and ∂W
∂G
= ∂U
∂G
into the ﬁrst-order conditions
leads to (18), (19), and (20).
A.3 Derivation of (21)
Add and subtract ∂R
∂tD
1
h
= (tC
∂C
∂tD
+ tD
∂D
∂tD
+ D) 1
h
to (19) leads to
tC
h
∂C
∂tD
+
tD
h
∂D
∂tD
+ Ne′
∂U
∂E
∂D
∂tD
+ (μ− 1
h
)
∂R
tD
= 0. (A.4)
The ﬁrst-best allocation can be implemented by the mean of its prices, namely
pFL = h, p
F
C = 1, and p
F
D = 1 + t
F
D = 1 − hNe′ ∂U∂EF . Hence, the second-best tax-
rates are tSC := p
S
C − 1 = pSC − pFC and tSD := pSD − 1 = (pSD − pFD) + (pFD − 1) =
(pSD − pFD)− hNe′ ∂U∂EF .
Using these as well as the property ∂C
∂tD
= ∂D
∂tC
, which can be concluded from
the symmetry of the Slutsky matrix because D(·) and C(·) are Hicksian demand
functions, leads to equation (A.4).
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A.4 The Commodity Substitution Eﬀect
The diﬀerential of equation (30), namely dtD = (1− τ)dtC can be written as
tˆD = (1− τ)1 + tC
1 + tD
tˆC ≡ ΩtˆC , (A.5)
where Ω < 1, if tD > tC and 1− τ < 1. This implies tˆD − tˆC = (Ω − 1)tˆC < 0.
Therefore, tˆC − tˆD > 0.
A.5 Derivation of (29)
Assuming a constant level of government spending (dG = 0), the change in
consumption of C and D due to a change in tD can be solved.
Using tL = 0 and dG = 0, the total diﬀerential of the government budget
constraint (9) can be written as dtCC+ tCdC+dtDD+ tDdD = 0 and rearranged
to
pCC
pCC + pDD
(
tˆC +
tC
1 + tC
Cˆ
)
+
pDD
pCC + pDD
(
tˆD +
tD
1 + tD
Dˆ
)
= 0. (A.6)
Out of equations (34), (36), and (37) one gets
πCCˆ + πDDˆ = − pCC
pCC + pDD
tˆC−
(
1− pCC
pCC + pDD
)
tˆD. (A.7)
Using equations (A.6), (28) and (A.7) one has three equations depending on the
variables Cˆ, Dˆ, tˆD and tˆC , which can be solved as functions of tˆD.
Substituting Dˆ and Cˆ, equations (A.7) and (28) can be combined to
Cˆ =
1
C + D
(
tˆD(σD + pDD) + tˆC(−σD − pCC)
)
(A.8)
Dˆ =
1
C + D
(−tˆD(σC + pDD)− tˆC(pCC − σC)) . (A.9)
Inserting these results into (A.6) leads to
tˆC =
D
C
−pDD(1− tD) + C(−pD(1− tC) + σ(tD − tC))
pCC(1− tC) + D(pC(1− tD) + σ(tD − tC)) tˆD. (A.10)
Implementing (A.10) into (A.8) and (A.9) leads to the general equilibrium
response of a change in tD
Cˆ =
dC
C
=
D
C
σ((1− tD)(pCC + pDD)
pCC(1− tC) + D(pC(1− tD) + σ(tD − tC)) (A.11)
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and
Dˆ =
dD
D
= − σ(1− tC)(pCC + pDD)
pCC(1− tC) + D(pC(1− tD) + σ(tD − tC)) . (A.12)
Therefore, dC
dD
= 1−tD
1−tC . Using this result in equation (14) leads to equation (29).
A.6 Comparative Static
To show the general equilibrium eﬀect of an increase in G on the variables
C,D, L, w, tc, and tD equations (28), (34), (36), (37) and (A.5) are used, as well
as the diﬀerentiated household budget constraint (A.6) where the change in G is
taken into account, namely pCC
pCC+pDD
(tˆC+
tC
1+tC
Cˆ)+ pDD
pCC+pDD
(tˆD+
tD
1+tD
Dˆ) = G
NhL
Gˆ.
A.6.1 Table 1 (Metcalf, 2003, 320)
A.6.2 Table 2 (Metcalf, 2003, 320)
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A.6.3 Table 3 (Metcalf, 2003, 320)
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Abstract
This thesis deals with the connection between the use of pollution taxation and
the impact on the environmental quality. Noting the popularity of pollution
taxation within policy making, its eﬀects on the environmental quality will be
determined and evaluated. For this analysis a general equilibrium model that
shows the inﬂuences of diﬀerent markets is used.
Considering the diﬀerence between tax rates and the corresponding alloca-
tions, it is shown that the reached environmental quality is higher in a tax system
where distortionary taxes are used than if lump-sum taxation would be available.
Additional public spending and therefore higher tax distortions lead to an
increase in environmental quality, while the environmental component of the pol-
lution tax decreases. Distorted taxation systems do not - diﬀerent than from the
double-dividend idea expected - favour pollution taxation as source for public
revenue. Solely knowing the resulting change in the optimal pollution tax rate is
not suﬃcient for determining the occurring impact on the environment.
It can be concluded that using pollution taxation in a tax system where the
deadweight loss is minimised will lead to a desirable improvement of the environ-
ment.

Zusammenfassung
Die vorliegende Diplomarbeit bescha¨ftigt sich mit dem Zusammenhang zwischen
der Verwendung von Umweltsteuern und deren Auswirkungen auf die Umwelt-
qualita¨t. Da Umweltsteuern als Politikinstrument augenscheinlich sehr popula¨r
sind, werden die Eﬀekte derselben bestimmt und bewertet. Fu¨r diese Analyse
wird ein Gleichgewichts-Modell, das die Einﬂu¨sse verschiedener Ma¨rkte sichtbar
macht, betrachtet.
Wird der Unterschied zwischen Steuerraten und den dazu geho¨rigen Alloka-
tionen beru¨cksichtigt, kann gezeigt werden, dass die Umweltqualita¨t in einem
Steuersystem mit verzerrenden Steuern ho¨her ist, als wenn die Verwendung von
Pauschalsteuern mo¨glich wa¨re.
Werden die Staatsausgaben und damit auch die auftretenden Verzerrungen in
einem Steuersystem erho¨ht, ist eine Steigerung der Umweltqualita¨t zu beobachten,
obwohl die Umweltkomponente der optimalen Umweltsteuer abnimmt. Daher
wird diese, anders als von der Diskussion u¨ber eine doppelte Dividende der
Umweltsteuer erwartet, in einem verzerrten Steuersystem nicht fu¨r die Gener-
ierung von Staatseinnahmen bevorzugt. Aus der resultierenden A¨nderung der
optimalen Umweltsteuerrate kann nicht auf die auftretenden Umwelteﬀekte ge-
schlossen werden.
Aus der Modellbetrachtung kann gefolgert werden, dass die Verwendung von
Umweltsteuern in einem Steuersystem, welches den Wohlfahrtsverlust minimiert,
einen positiven Einﬂuss auf die Umweltqualita¨t hat.
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